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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the
Honorable John F. Wahlquist denying petioner's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging continued incarceration pursuant to a plea
1

!

l 0f

guilty to a charge of forgery entered Janu-

:ary 3, 1963.
I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Petitioner-appellant filed, without the
lassistance of lega 1 counse 1, a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus with the District Court

l,f Weber County,

State of Utah, challenging the

llegality of his incarceration in the Weber County
)Jail (R. 1-3).

District Judge Calvin Gould re-

ceived the petition and set the matter for hearJing on February 14, 1972, and appointed counsel

ro represent

petitioner.

On the date set for

hearing, petitioner appeared and was represented

lby

counsel.

The defendants appeared and were

represented by counse 1.

Due to a mixup in sched-

uling, no judge was available to hear the matter

land the case was rescheduled for March 19, 1972,
2

by the Court Administrator.
A hearing on the petition was held on
the latter date before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, Judge of District Court, sitting
without jury.

Testimony was introduced by

both plaintiff and defendants and the matter
was continued until March 15, 1972, to allow
the State to produce appropriate transcript
records of the proceedings when petitioner
entered his plea in 1963.

(TR 130)

On March 15, 1972, the hearing was continued after a report that the records were
not available.

All issues were argued, briefs

were submitted and the Court took the matter

I

l
l

under advisement.

The following day the Court

issued a four-page memorandum decision denying
the petition.

(R 73-76)

3.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner-appellant respectfully requests
!this Court to find that his plea of guilty to
1

the charge of forgery was made without a meaning-

l

fol or effective waiver of the rights necessarily

}waived by such plea and that it is, therefore,
void; and to reverse the District Court's deci-

Jsion

his petition for writ of habeas

Jcorpus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Richard B. Dolan, the petitioner herein,
lentered a plea of guilty to an information charg. ing him with the crime of forgery.

His plea was

before the Honorable Parley E. Norseth,
JJudge of the District Court of Weber County,

.State
1

of Utah, on January 3, 1963.

(TR 3-4)

was represented by counsel, L.G.

4.

Bingham, Esquire.

(R 56, 62)

The petitioner was sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison for one to

I
l

I
I
I
I

l

twenty years on February 14, 1963 (R 34).
Petitioner served approximately thirty-seven
months in prison, was paroled in March of
1966 and then recommitted to prison in October of 1966 wherein he served an additional
thirty months until a second parole in May
of 1969.

On February 2, 1968, petitioner filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court of Salt Lake County.

(R 31)

This initial petition challenged the Court's
j udgrnen t and sentence on the plea by assert-

ing the plea had been coerced by promises
made by petitioner's counsel and by officers

5.

of the State.

1

(R 38)

The State produc:·.'. no re-

cord to rebut these claims but the petition was
dismissed without opinion on June 4, 1968, (R 45)

1

i

and was not appealed.
Petitioner was paroled and while on parole

l

was charged with another offense.

A "parole hold"

was placed on him and he was held without bail
} for more than seven (7) months awaiting disposi-

l

ti on of charges.

(HT 3)

He appeared be fore the

Hon. Calvin Gould, Judge of the District Court of
lweber County, in chambers, on January 2!;, 1972.
lThere he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

(R 6)

A hearing was held before the Hon.

Lohn F. Wahlquist, Judge of the District Court of

IWeber County

on March 10, 1972, (HT 1) and his

lpe'.ition was denied.

It is from this denial of

this petition that the instant appeal is taken.

6.

At that hearing the petitioner testified
that at the time of his plea of guilty he knew
what he was charged with but that he had not
been advised, by eitherhis attorney or the
Court, as to the possible punishment, possible
defenses or the existence of lesser included
offenses.

(H.T. 5)

He testified further that

he similarly had not been advised of any of
the rights necessarily waived by a plea of
guilty; nor that such a plea constituted an
admission of every material fact alleged in
the information.

(H.T. 6)

On cross-examina-

tion it appeared that the petitioner, despite
the lack of advice, did know that he was charged
with a felony and that he understood a felony
to be somethina
more serious than a misdemeanor.
0

I
I

(H.T. 13)

When asked on cross-examination if

7.

•
l'

I'he had

ever been charged with a felony before,

replied, "yes, bastardy" (a non-criminal
.action) and carnal knowledge, a charge which

I

1

was dismissed.

(H.T. 14)

It appeared that he knew something of his
lright to trial by jury and his right to confront
witnesses (H. T. 17-19) but that he did not know
'he had the .right to remain silent (H. T. 19-21)

IMr.

Dolan also testified that at the time of his

earlier application for writ of habeas corpus he
)was not aware of the legal significance of his
right to be advised as to the rights he waived
, by a plea of guilty and the consequences of such

la plea.

(H. T. 23)

The defendant called as a witness L.G.
Bingham, Esquire, who had represented Mr. Dolan

lat the

plea and sentencing.

8.

Mr. Bingham testified

in general as to his usual practice.

He had

no specific recollection of the case.

(H.T.

25 et seq)

Mr. Bingham stated that it would

be his usual practice to discuss each case
with his clients and explain their rights
but that the extent of such advice would depend
on the individual and that he could not recall
what, if anything, he had told Mr. Dolan in that
regard.

(H.T. 28)

The Court reporter testified that he was
not able to locate his notes of the hearing at
which the guilty plea was entered and therefore
could not prepare a transcript of the proceedings (H. T. 38).
Mr. Dolan's petition was denied in an

opinion by Judge Wahlquist dated March 16,

1972.

Judge Wahlquist based his opinion on

9.

' principles of res judicata and upon a finding
t hat the " . . . defendant's ri.'ghts, etc . , we re

'not prejudiced in any way by the failure of Judge
''Norseth to discuss these matters with him in
.open Court."

(R. 76)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT
APPLY WHERE THE PETITIONER WAS NOT AWARE
OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER ISSUES AT THE
TIME OF THE FIRST PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS.

Res judicata in habeas corpus matters is
I

lot governed by the same concepts that apply to
\ases involving private litigants.

Rather the

iraditional nature of this ancient proceeding
equires that each contention of a petitioner
even if successively, unless the
ltitioner is deliberately withholding grounds

10.

ts

for relief and thus abusing the procedure.
Sanders v. U.S., 375 U.S. 1, 83 S. Ct. 1068
(1963).
The Courts of this state have generally
considered that where a petitioner could have
raised an issue in an earlier application for
writ of habeas corpus he is precluded from
raising it in a later one.

Wood v. Turner,

19 Utah 2d. 133, 427 P. 2d. 397 (1967), Maxwell v. Turner, 23 Utah 2d. 12, 455 P. 2d.
912 (1969).

The difficult language in this

line of cases is the word "could".

In con-

sidering the applicable standard the United
States Supreme Court decided in Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 92

I
I

L. Ed. 1356 (1948), that a petitioner who was
justifiably ignorant of the newly-alleged facts
11.

J or

unaware of their legal significance could

]not reasonably be held to be responsible for
fuiling to include them in any earlier appli-

j cac1on.
-.
In the instant case we have two succesJsive petitions based on different grounds and
a petitioner who was totally unaware of the legal
)significance of the facts upon which the second
,application was based.

1

To hold that the peti-

tioner shall have included in his first appli-

lcation matters which he did not know were of
}legal consequence would be inconsistent with the
nature of the writ of habeas corpus.

Sanders,

J
POINT II

I

I
I

THE PETITIONER'S PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE
CHARGE OF FORGERY WAS MADE WITHOUT A KNOWING AND INFORMED WAIVER OF HIS RIGHTS
12.

I

I

I

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES AND IS, THEREFORE, VOID.
A plea of guilty by its very nature
constitutes a surrender of three rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States
Amendments V, VI, and XIV.

These are the right

to trial by jury, the right to confront one's
accusers, and the right of a defendant to avoid
compulsory self-incrimination.

Duncan v. Loui-

siana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed.
2d. 491 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
85 S. Ct . 10 6 5 , 13 L. Ed . 2d • 9 23 ( 19 6 5) ;

Mallov v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489,
12 L. Ed. 653 (1964).

It is axiomatic then

that a plea of guilty will be void unless these

I
I

,
i

rights are effectively waived.

Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed.
13.

I
11461 (1938 is the case most frequently cited as
)setting the standard for determining the valid
of a federal right.

That case defined

taiver as an intentional relinquishment of a
Jknown right.

Ibid at page 1466.

Moreover, the

Court therein stated that Courts should indulge
every reasonable presumption against a waiver of
any fundamental constitutional right rather than
rresume more acquiescence in the loss.

'page 1466.

Ibid at

Even in a State Court proceeding,

effective waiver of a federal right is governed

Jby federal standards.

Douglas v. Alabama, 380

U.S. 415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L. Ed. 2d. 934 (1965)
lcited in Boykin v. Alabama 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.
ICt. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d. 274 (1969).

Since a

Waiver must be intentional and understanding in
larder to be effective, an accused cannot make such

l
I

14.

an effective waiver unless he possesses an

)
l
J

understanding of the law in relation to the
facts in the particular case.

It was upon

this premise that the United States Supreme
Court ruled in McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459,

) it was the responsibility of the trial judge
I to answer that the accused had such a full

89 S. Ct. 1166, 22 L. Ed. 2d. 418 (1969)that

I
I

!

I

understanding of the meaning of a plea of

guilty and of its consequences.

McCarthy

arose as a question concerning construction

l

I
I

l

I

of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure but the Court spoke in constitutional
terms and its holding was quoted with approval
in Boykin, supra, which dealt with a state case.
The concept that a trial judge bears this responsibility is not original with McCarthy as numer15.

1 ous cases

12d.

have so held.

Woods v. Rhay,

tl4 p.

601 (Wash. 1966); Hughes v. U.S., 3,)i, F. 2d .

. 91 (5th Cir. 1962), Copenhaver v. State, 431 P. 2d.
I

1669 (Okla. App. 1967).
Boykin, supra, is the summation of the cur-

i

rent law in this area and stands for two proposi-

l

.

\ t1ons.
(1)

a

The same standards which the Court has

. previously held to apply to waiver of other federI

i al rights,
.

such as the right to counsel, apply

1also to the waiver of rights by a plea of guilty.
(2)

Such a waiver will not be presumed by

a silent record.

'

There is some controversy over whether or

· not Boykin is to be applied retroactively.
1

In

these cases which have come before the United

"'

JStates Supreme Court for a determination of a pre-

16.

l

Boykin plea, the Court has found effective
waiver without reaching the retroactivity
issue.

In Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 90

S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d. 747 (1970), the
Court found that the record of the pre-Boykin
plea of guilty satisfied the requirements of
that case and noted in a footnote that they
had not yet made a determination of retroactivity.

A survey of the cases indicates that

the portion of Boykin setting out the standard
for determining waiver is being applied retroactively.

Belgarde v. Turner, 307 F. Supp.

936 (Utah 1969).

In North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L.

'. 2d.

162 (1970), the Court found the plea to conform
with what it called the substantive standards
of that case and that there was in fact a show-

17.

ing of affirmative waiver in the record.
footnote at page 166.

Ibid,

In the body of the opin-

ion the Court stated in reference to the 1963
plea that Boykin set out the standard for deter-

mining the effectiveness of a waiver of rights
by a guilty plea and applied that standard.

' Boykin

To consider the substantive portion of
to be retroactive but not the requirement

of a record would comport with the principles of
determining when to apply a decision retroactively
as set out in Adams v. Illinois,-U.S;-J92 S.
31 L. Ed. 2d. 202 (1972).

In its discussion of

this issue the Court stated these critera:

(1)

the purpose of the new standards; (2) the extent
of reliance and (3) the effect of retroactivity
·

the administration of justice.
The Court pointed out that the importance

18.

of the first may outweigh the latter two and
r·

l

that the right to counsel was held fully retroactive in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d. 799 (1963).

In Adams, however, the Court held that the rig
to counsel at preliminary hearing would not be

l
r
L

r

applied retroactively.

The requirement of

Boykin regarding the record of the proceedings
would seem not to be of such great import that
it should be applied retroactively.

Although

some states have themselves had such a require
ment, many have not.

McBain v. Maxwell, 466 P

2d. 177 (Wash. App. 1970).

In contrast the

standards for determining waiver are at least
as old as Johnson v. Zerbst, and have been qui
broadly, if not uniformly, applied.

Moreover,

as the Court indicated in Brady, supra, this i
19.

the substantial portion of the holding.

It

should also be noted that in

these

standards the Boykin Court specifically analogized to the standards applicable to the waiver
of the right to counsel; these standards are retroactive.

Gideon, supra.

In the instant case the petitioner was not
advised in fact of the rights waived by a plea
of guilty nor by the nature and consequences of
such a plea.

He did have some personal knowledge

of the right to trial by jury and of the right
to confront his accusers; he lacked actual knowledge of his right not to incriminate himself.
He did not know the penalty which could be imposed upon his plea.

Without such knowledge he

could not have effectively waived his ri5hts to
trial by jury, confrontation of accusers, or

20.

against self-incrimination.

One cannot waive

a right he does not know he possesses.
CONCLUSION
The petitioner did not by his plea of
guilty effectively waive his rights under the
Constitution of the United States for the reason that he was never advised as to the
nature and consequences of his plea and was
not in fact aware of such.

His petition for

writ of habeas corpus on this ground cannot be
barred by res judicata because he had no know-

ledge of the significance of the facts and is- •
sues presented here at the time of his earlier
petition.
Respectfully submitted,

21.

WILLIAM D. MARSH
Attorney for Petitioner
1018 First Security Bank Bldg'
Ogden, Utah 84401

